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1 Hierarchical versus Linear Recency
In computational theories of discourse, there are at least three processes presumed to op-
erate under a limited attention constraint of some type: (1) ellipsis interpretation;
(2) pronominal anaphora interpretation; and (3) inference of discourse relations between
representations A and B of utterances in a discourse, e.g. B motivates A. In each case,
the interpretation of the current element B of a discourse depends on the accessibility
of another earlier element A. According to the limited attention constraint only
a limited number of candidates need to be considered in the processing of B, e.g. only a
limited number of entities in the discourse model are potential cospecifiers for a pronoun.
The limited attention constraint has been defined by some researchers by linear
recency: a representation of an utterance A is linearly recent for a representation
of an utterance B if A is linearly adjacent to B. Using linear recency as a model of the
limited attention constraint would mean that an antecedent for an anaphor is determined
by a linear backward search of the text, or of a discourse model representation of the
text (Clark and Sengul, 1979) inter alia.
In contrast, other work has formulated the limited attention constraint in terms of
hierarchical recency (Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Hobbs, 1985; Mann and Thompson,
1987) inter alia. A representation of an utterance A is hierarchically recent for
a representation of an utterance B if A is adjacent to B in the tree structure of the
discourse. Of all theories based on hierarchical recency, only Grosz and Sidner’s theory
of discourse structure provides an operationalization of hierarchical recency in terms of
their stack model of attentional state (Sidner, 1979; Grosz, 1977; Grosz and Sidner,
1986). Thus, below, the relationship between limited attention and hierarchical recency
will be discussed in terms of their stack model, but the discussion should also apply to
claims about the role of hierarchical recency in other work.
In the remainder of this squib, I will argue that the limited attention constraint
must account for three types of evidence: (1) the occurrence of informationally re-
dundant utterances in naturally occurring dialogues (Walker, 1993); (2) the infelicity
of discourses that depend on accessing discourse entities that are not linearly recent; and
(3) experiments that show that humans have limited attentional capacity (Miller, 1956;
Baddeley, 1986).
2 Evidence for Limited Attention from Anaphoric Processing
In figure 1, Dialogue A, hierarchical recency supports the interpretation of the pro-
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Dialogue A Dialogue B
(4) C: Ok Harry, I’m have a problem (4) C: Ok Harry, I’m have a problem
that uh my - with today’s economy that uh my - with today’s economy
my daughter is working, my daughter is working
(5) H: I missed your name. (5) H: I missed your name.
(6) C: Hank. (6) C: Hank
(6.2) H: Is that H A N K?
(6.3) C: Yes.
(7) H: Go ahead Hank (7) H: Go ahead Hank
(8a) C: as well as her uh husband. (8a) C: as well as her uh husband.
(8b) They have a child. (8b) They have a child.
(8c) and they bring the child to us (8c) and they bring the child to us
every day for babysitting. every day for babysitting.
Figure 1
Dialogue A does not include the extra utterances shown in Dialogue B. Dialogue B is identical
to A except for utterances 6.2, 6.3.
forms in utterance (8a) from a radio talk show for financial advice (Pollack, Hirschberg,
and Webber, 1982). In utterance A-5, H interrupts C’s narrative to ask for his name,
but in A-8, C continues as though A-4 had just been said. Utterance A-8a realizes the
proposition My daughter’s husband is working as well, but this realization depends on
both an anaphoric referent and an anaphoric property.
According to the stack model, since utterances A-5 . . . A-7 are part of an embedded
segment, A-4 is hierarchically recent when A-8 is interpreted. A new focus space is
pushed on the stack during the processing of dialogue A when the intention of utterance 5
is recognized. Since utterance 7 clearly indicates completion of the interrupting segment,
the focus space for the interruption in 5 to 7 is popped from the stack after utterance
7, leaving the focus space for utterances 1 to 4 on the top of the stack. This focus space
supports the interpretation of the proforms in A-8a.
However, consider the variation of dialogue A in dialogue B in figure 1. Here, the
segment between B-5 . . . B-7 is also an embedded segment. Utterance B-7 indicates
completion of the embedded segment and signals a pop. So, by the stack model, this
segment is handled by the same focus stack popping mechanism as we saw for dialogue
A.
However, in dialogue B, utterance 8a is more difficult, if not impossible, to interpret.
This is surprising because utterance B-4 is hierarchically recent for B-8a, just as it is
in dialogue A. The interruption in dialogue B is but a slightly longer version of that in
dialogue A. Inasmuch as the stack model is a precise formulation of hierarchical recency, it
does not predict the infelicity of dialogue B. The problem arises partly because the stack
model includes no constraints related to the length, depth, or the amount of processing
required for an embedded segment. Thus, these types of extended embedded segments
suggest that the limited attention constraint must be sensitive to some aspect of linear
recency.
3 Evidence for Limited Attention from Informational Redundancy
Additional evidence for the influence of linear recency arises from the analysis of infor-
mationally redundant utterances (IRUs) in naturally-occurring discourse (Walker,
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1993).1 IRUs realize propositions already established as mutually believed in the dis-
course. IRUs have antecedents in the discourse, which are those utterances that orig-
inally established the propositions realized by the IRU as mutually believed. Consider
excerpt C from the financial advice corpus. Here E has been telling H about how her
money is invested, and then poses a question in C-3. IRUs in the examples below are
capitalized and their antecedents are italicized.
(C) ( 3) E: And I was wondering – should I continue on with the certificates or
( 4) H: Well it’s difficult to tell because we’re so far away from any of them – but I
would suggest this – if all of these are 6 month certificates and I presume they are
( 5) E: Yes
( 6) H: Then I would like to see you start spreading some of that money around
( 7) E: uh huh
( 8) H: Now in addition, how old are you?
.
(discussion and advice about retirement investments)
.
(21) E: uh huh and
(22a) H: But as far as the certificates are concerned,
(22b) I’D LIKE THEM SPREAD OUT A LITTLE BIT -
(22c) THEY’RE ALL 6 MONTH CERTIFICATES
(23) E: Yes
(24) H: And I don’t like putting all my eggs in one basket...
The utterances in 22b and 22c realize propositions previously established as mutually
believed, so they are IRUs.2 The cue word but in utterance 22a indicates a push, a new
intention (Grosz and Sidner, 1986). The phrase as far as the certificates are concerned
indicates that this new intention is subordinate to the previous discussion of the cer-
tificates. Thus, utterance 22a, but as far as the certificates are concerned, has the effect
that the focus space related to the discussion of retirement investments, corresponding
to utterances 8 to 21, is popped from the stack.
This means that the focus space representation of the intention for utterances 4 to
7 are on the top of the stack after C-22a, when 22b and 22c are processed. Therefore
there are two reasons why it is surprising that H restates the content of utterances 4, 5
and 6 in 22b and 22c: (1) The propositions realized by 22b and 22c are already mutually
believed; and (2) These mutual beliefs should be salient by virtue of being on top of
the stack. If they are salient by virtue of being on top of the stack, they should be
accessible for processes such as content-based inferences or the inference of discourse
relations. If they must be accessible for these inferences to take place, as I will argue
below, their reintroduction suggests that in fact they are not accessible. Many similar
examples of IRUs are found in the corpus (Walker, 1993). Thus, these types of IRUs
show that hierarchical recency, as realized by the stack model, does not predict when
information is accessible.
4 The Cache Model of Attentional State
The evidence above suggests the need for a model of attentional state in discourse that
reflects the limited attentional capacity of human processing. Here, I propose an alternate
model to the stack model, which I will call the cache model, and discuss the evidence
1 A subclass of Attention IRUs, Open-Segment IRUs, is discussed here.
2 The antecedents are in utterances 4, 5 and 6: H asserted the content of 22b to E in 6. E indicated
understanding and implicated acceptance of this assertion in 7 (Walker, 1992), and E confirmed the
truth of the content of 22c for H in 5.
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for this model. In section 5, I compare a number of dimensions of the cache and stack
models.
The notion of a cache in combination with main memory, as is standard in compu-
tational architectures, is a good basis for a computational model of human attentional
capacity in processing discourse. All conversants in a dialogue have their own cache and
some conversational processes are devoted to keeping these caches synchronized.
The cache model consists of: (1) basic mechanisms and architectural properties; (2)
assumptions about processing; (3) specification of which mechanism is applied at which
point. The cache represents working memory and main memory represents long-term
memory. The cache is a limited capacity, almost instantaneously accessible, memory
store. The exact specification of this capacity must be determined by future work, but
previous research suggests a limit of 2 or 3 sentences, or approximately 7 propositions
(Kintsch, 1988; Miller, 1956). Main memory is larger than the cache, but is slower to
access (Baddeley, 1986; Kintsch, 1988).
There are three operations involving the cache and main memory. Items in the cache
can be preferentially retained and items in main memory can be retrieved to the
cache. Items in the cache can also be stored to main memory.
When new items are retrieved from main memory to the cache, or enter the cache
directly due to events in the world, other items may be displaced, because the cache
has limited capacity. Displaced items are stored in main memory. The determination of
which items to displace is handled by a cache replacement policy. The specification of the
cache replacement policy is left open, however, replacing items that haven’t been recently
used, with the exception of those items that are preferentially retained, is a good working
assumption, as shown by previous work on linear recency.3
The cache model includes specific assumptions about processing. Discourse processes
execute on elements that are in the cache. All of the premises for an inference must be
simultaneously in the cache for the inference to be made (McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992;
Walker, 1993). If a discourse relation is to be inferred between two separate segments, a
representation of both segments must be simultaneously in the cache (Fletcher, Hummel,
and Marsolek, 1990; Walker, 1993). The cospecifier of an anaphor must be in the cache for
automatic interpretation, or be strategically retrieved to the cache in order to interpret
the anaphor (Greene, McKoon, and Ratcliff, 1992). Thus what is contained in the cache at
any one time is a working set consisting of discourse entities such as entities, properties
and relations that are currently being used for some process.
Two factors determine when cache operations are applied: (1) the speaker’s intentions
and the hearer’s recognition of intention; (2) expectations about what will be discussed.
The cache model maintains the distinction between intentional structure and atten-
tional state first proposed by Grosz and Sidner (1986). This distinction is critical. Just
as a cache can be used for processing the references and operations of a hierarchically
structured program, so can a cache be used to model attentional state when discourse in-
tentions are hierarchically structured. The intentions of a conversant and the recognition
of the other’s intentions determine what is retrieved from main memory and what is
preferentially retained in the cache.
When conversants start working towards the achievement of a new intention, that
intention may utilize information that was already in the cache. If so, that information
will be preferentially retained in the cache because it is being used. Whenever the new
intention requires information that is not currently in the cache, that information must
3 Obviously, linear recency is simply an approximation to what is in the cache. If something has been
recently discussed, it was recently in the cache, and thus is is more likely to still be in the cache
than other items. However, linear recency ignores the effects of retention and retrieval.
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be retrieved from main memory. Thus the process of initiating the achievement of the
new intention has the result that some, and perhaps all, of the items currently in the
cache are replaced with items having to do with the new intention.
When conversants return to a prior intention, information relevant to that intention
must be retrieved from main memory if it has not been retained in the cache.
When an intention is completed, it is not necessary to strategically retain information
relevant to the completed segment in the cache. It does not necessarily mean that there
is an automatic retrieval of information related to other intentions. However, automatic
retrieval processes can be triggered by associations between information being currently
discussed and information stored in main memory (Greene, McKoon, and Ratcliff, 1992).
These processes make items salient that have not been explicitly mentioned.
expectations about what will be discussed also determine operations on the cache.
Expectations can arise from shared knowledge about the task, and from the prior dis-
course (Grosz, 1977; Malt, 1984). Expectations can arise from interruptions when the
nature of the interruption makes it obvious that there will be a return to the interrupted
segment. When the pursuit of an intention is momentarily interrupted, as in dialogue A,
the conversants attempt to retain the relevant material in the cache during the interrup-
tion.
5 Evaluating Critical Evidence: comparing the cache with the stack
In this section, I wish to examine evidence for the cache model, look at further predictions
of the model,and then discuss evidence relevant to both stack and cache models in order
to draw direct comparisons between them. First, I contrast the mechanisms of the models
with respect to certain discourse processes.
•New intention subordinate to current intention: (1) Stack pushes new focus
space; (2) Cache retrieves entities related to new intention
• Intention completed: (1) Stack pops focus space for intention from stack,
entities in focus space are no longer accessible; (2) Cache doesn’t retain entities
for completed intention, but they remain accessible until displaced
•New intention subordinate to prior intention: (1) Stack pops focus spaces for
intervening segments, focus space for prior intention accessible after pop; (2)
Cache retrieves entities related to prior intention from main memory to cache,
unless retained in the cache
• Informationally redundant utterances: (1) Stack predicts no role for IRUs when
they are represented in focus space on top of stack, because information should
be immediately available; (2) Cache predicts that IRUs reinstantiate or refresh
known information in the cache
•Returning from interruption: (1) In the stack model, the length and depth of
the interruption and the processing required is irrelevant; (2) In the cache
model, the length of the interruption or the processing required predicts
retrievals from main memory
First, consider the differences in the treatment of interruptions. The state of the stack
when returning from an interruption is identical for interruptions of various lengths and
depths of embedding. In the cache model, an interruption may give rise to an expectation
of a return to a prior intention, and each participant may attempt to retain information
relevant to pursuing that intention in their cache. However, it may not be possible to
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retain the relevant material in the cache. In dialogue B, the interruption is too long
and the working set for the interruption uses all of the cache. When this happens, the
relevant material is displaced to main memory. On returning after an interruption, the
conversants must initiate a cued retrieval of beliefs and intentions. This will require some
processing effort, yielding the prediction that there will be a short period of time in which
the cache does not have the necessary information. This would mean that the processing
of incoming information would be slower until all of the required information is in the
cache.4 The ease with which the conversants can return to a previous discussion will
then rely on the retrievability of the required information from main memory, and this
in turn depends on what is stored in main memory and the type of cue provided by the
speaker as to what to retrieve. For example, if processing involves the surface form of
the utterance, as it might dialogue B, we can explain the clear-cut infelicity by the fact
that surface forms are not normally stored in main memory (Sachs, 1967).
Next, consider the differences between the models with respect to the function of
IRUs. In dialogue C, a version of the dialogue without the IRUs is possible but is harder
to interpret. Consider dialogue C without 22b, 22c and 23, i.e. replace 22a to 24 with But
as far as the certificates are concerned, I don’t like all my eggs in one basket. Interpreting
this alternate version requires the same inference, namely that having all your investments
in six month certificates constitutes the negatively evaluated condition of having all your
eggs in one basket. However the inference requires more effort to process.
The stack model doesn’t predict a function for the IRUs. However, according to the
cache model, IRUs make information accessible that is not accessible by virtue of hi-
erarchical recency, so that processes of content-based inferences, inference of discourse
relations, and interpretation of anaphors can take place with less effort. Thus, one pre-
diction of the cache model is that a natural way to make the anaphoric forms in dialogue
B more easily interpretable is to re-realize the relevant proposition with an IRU, as in
8a’:My problem is that my daughter is working, as well as her uh husband.
The IRU may function this way since: (1) the IRU reinstantiates the necessary in-
formation in the cache; or (2) the IRU is a retrieval cue for retrieval of information to
the cache. Here reinstantiation is certainly sufficient, but in general these cases cannot
be distinguished from corpus analysis. It should be possible to test psychologically us-
ing reaction time methods, whether and under what conditions IRUs function to simply
reinstantiate an entity in the cache, and when they serve as retrieval cues.
Next, consider the differences in status of the entities in completed discourse seg-
ments. In the stack model, focus spaces for segments that have been closed are popped
from the stack and entities in those focus spaces are not accessible. In the cache model,
“popping” only occurs via displacement. Thus even when a segment is clearly closed, if
a new topic has not been initiated, the popped entities should still be available. Some
support for the cache model predictions about popped entities is that (1) rules proposed
for deaccenting noun phrases treat popped entities as accessible (Davis and Hirschberg,
1988); and (2) Rules for referring expressions in argumentative texts treat the conclu-
sions of popped sisters as salient (Huang, 1994). Stronger evidence would be the reaction
times to the mention of entities in a closed segment, after it is clear that a new segment
has been initiated, but before the topic of that new segment has initiated a retrieval to,
and hence displacement from, the cache.
It should also be possible to test whether entities that are in the focus spaces on
the stack, according to the stack model, are more accessible than entities that have been
4 This could predict the observed occurrence of disfluencies at segment boundaries (Passonneau and
Litman, 1994).
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popped off the stack. In the cache model, the entities in these focus spaces would not
have a privileged attentional status, unless of course they had been refreshed in the cache
by being realized implicitly or explicitly in the intervening discussion.
Finally, consider one of the most studied predictions of the stack model: cases where
a pronoun has an antecedent in a prior focus space. These cases have been called return
pops or focus pops (Grosz, 1977; Sidner, 1979; Reichman, 1985; Fox, 1987; Passonneau
and Litman, 1994). In the stack model, any of the focus spaces on the stack can be
returned to, and the antecedent for a pronoun can be in any of these focus spaces. As a
potential alternative to the stack model, the cache model appears to be unable to handle
return pops since a previous state of the cache can’t be popped to. Since return pops are
a primary motivation for the stack model, I will re-examine all of the naturally-occurring
return pops that I was able to find in the literature. There are 21 of them. While it
would be premature to draw final conclusions from such a small sample size, I will argue
that the data supports the conclusion that return pops are cued retrieval from main
memory and that the cues reflect the context of the pop (Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988).
Thus, return pops are not problematic for the cache model.
In the cache model, there are at least three possibilities for how the context is created
so that pronouns in return pops can be interpreted: (1) The pronoun alone functions
as a retrieval cue (Greene, McKoon, and Ratcliff, 1992); or (2) The content of the first
utterance in a return indicates what information to retrieve from main memory to the
cache, which implies that the interpretation of the pronoun is delayed; (3) The shared
knowledge of the conversants creates expectations that determines what is in the cache,
e.g. shared knowledge of the task structure.
Let us consider the first possibility. The view that pronouns must be able to function
as retrieval cues is contrary to the view that pronouns indicate entities that are currently
salient (Prince, 1981). However, there are certain cases where a pronoun alone is a good
retrieval cue, such as when only one referent of a particular gender or number has been
discussed in the conversation. If competing antecedents are those that match the gender
and number of the pronoun (Fox, 1987), then only 11 of the 21 return pops found in the
literature have competing antecedents.
Thus, the numbers suggest that in about half the cases we could expect the pronoun
to function as an adequate retrieval cue based on gender and number alone. In fact,
Sidner proposed that return pops might always have this property in her stacked focus
constraint: “Since anaphors may co-specify the focus or a potential focus, an anaphor
which is intended to co-specify a stacked focus must not be acceptable as co-specifying
either the focus or potential focus. If, for example, the focus is a noun phrase which can
be mentioned with an it anaphor, then it cannot be used to co-specify with a stacked
focus.” (Sidner, 1979), p. 88,89.
In addition, the representation of the anaphor should include selectional restrictions
from the verb’s subcategorization frame as retrieval cues (Di Eugenio, 1990). Of the 11
tokens with competing antecedents, 5 tokens have no competing antecedents if selectional
restrictions are also applied. For example, in the dialogues about the construction of
a pump from (Grosz, 1977), only some entities can be bolted, loosened, or made to
work. Only 4 pronouns of the 21 return pops have competing referents if a selectional
constraint can arise from the dialogue, e.g. if only one of the male discourse entities under
discussion has been riding a bike, then the verb rode serves as a cue for retrieving that
entity (Passonneau and Litman, 1994). Thus in 17 cases, an adequate retrieval cue is
constructed from processing the pronoun and the matrix verb (Di Eugenio, 1990).
The second hypothesis is that the content of the return utterance indicates what
information to retrieve from main memory to the cache. The occurrence of IRUs as in
dialogue C is one way of doing this. IRUs at the locus of a return can: (1) reinstantiate
7
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required information in the cache so that no retrieval is necessary; (2) function as excellent
retrieval cues for information from main memory. An examination of the data shows that
IRUs occur in 6 of the 21 return pops. IRUs in combination with selectional restrictions
leave only 2 cases of pronouns in return pops with competing antecedents.
In the remaining 2 cases, the competing antecedent is not and was never prominent in
the discourse, i.e. it was never the discourse center, suggesting that it may never compete
with the other cospecifier.
It should be possible to test how long it takes to resolve anaphors in return pops and
under what conditions it can be done, considering the data presented here on competing
referents, IRUs, explicit closing, and selectional restrictions. A probe just after a pronoun
in a return pop and before the verb could determine whether the pronoun alone is an
adequate retrieval cue, or whether selectional information from the verb is required or
simply speeds processing.
Finally, it should be possible to test whether pronouns in return pops are accented,
which signals to the hearer that the most recent antecedent is not the correct one (Cahn,
1991).
To conclude, the analysis presented here suggests many hypotheses that could be
empirically tested, which the currently available evidence does not enable us to resolve.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This squib has discussed the role of limited attention in a computational model of dis-
course processing. The cache model was proposed as a computational implemention of
human working memory and operations on attentional state are formulated as operations
on a cache. Just as a cache can be used for processing the references and operations of
a hierarchically structured program, so can a cache be used to model attentional state
when discourse intentions are hierarchically structured.
The store and retrieve operations of the cache model casts discourse processing as a
gradient phenomenon, predicting that the contents of the cache will change gradually,
and that change requires processing effort. The notion of processing effort for retrieval
operations on main memory makes predictions that can be experimentally tested. In
the meantime, the notion of increased processing effort in the cache model explains the
occurrence of a class of informationally redundant utterances in discourse, as well
as cases of infelicitous discourses constructed as variations on naturally occurring ones,
while remaining consistent with evidence on human limited attentional capacity. Finally,
the cache model appears to handle the class of “return pops” which prima facie should
be problematic for the model.
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